A tale of two decades: Typhoons and floods, Manila and the provinces, and the Marcos years by Warren, J.F.
 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 11 | Issue 43 | Number 3 | Oct 21, 2013
1
A Tale of Two Decades: Typhoons and Floods, Manila and the





In  the  second half  of  the  twentieth  century,
typhoon-triggered floods affected all sectors of
society  in  the Philippines,  but  none more so
than the urban poor, particularly the esteros-
dwellers or shanty-town inhabitants, residing in
the low-lying locales of Manila and a number of
other  cities  on  Luzon  and  the  Visayas.  The
growing  number  of  post-war  urban  poor  in
Manila, Cebu City and elsewhere, was largely
due  to  the  policy  repercussions  of  rapid
economic  growth  and  impoverishment  under
the military-led Marcos regime.1 At this time in
the  ear l y  1970s ,  rura l  pover ty  and
environmental  devastation  increased  rapidly,
and  on  a  hitherto  unknown  scale  in  the
Philippines.  Widespread  corruption,  crony
capitalism  and  deforesting  the  archipelago
caused  large-scale  forced  migration,
homelessness  and  a  radically  skewed
distribution  of  income  and  assets  that
continued  to  favour  elite  interests.2
The tai fung,  the great wind or typhoon, has
also been the scourge of Japan for centuries.
Traditionally, typhoons, along with floods and
famines, have played a major role in Japanese
statecraft as signs of the gods’ displeasure with
current  political  leadership,  and  sometimes
resulting  in  sudden  political  change  and
upheaval.  From  the  end  of  the  nineteenth
century the cost  of  damage caused by these
tropical  storms  escalated  as  Japanese
development  and  industrialisation  increased.
The typhoons and floods that occurred in the
Marcos years were labelled ‘natural disasters’
by  the  authorities  in  Manila.  But  in  fact,  it
would  have  been  more  appropriate  to  label
them  un-natural,  or  man-made  disasters
because  of  the  nature  of  politics  in  those
unsettling years.  The typhoons and floods of
the 1970s and 1980s, which took a huge toll in
lives  and  left  behind  an  enormous  trail  of
physical  destruction  and  other  impacts  after
the waters receded, were caused as much by
the  interactive  nature  of  politics  with  the
environment,  as  by  geography  and  the
typhoons  per  se,  as  the  principal  cause  of
natural  calamity.  The  increasingly  variable
nature  of  the  weather  and  climate  was  a
catalyst,  but not the sole determinant of  the
destruction  and  hidden  hazards  that  could
linger  for  years  in  the  aftermath  of  the
typhoons  and  floods  in  the  Marcos  years.3
Habibul  Haque  Khondker  notes  in  his
examination  of  the  relationship  between  the
great  November  cyclone  of  1970,  in  the
Bangladesh case, and the subsequent political
crisis,  that  the  political  environment  and  a
natural disaster can, and often do, interact with
one another.4
Nowhere  was  this  link  between  politics  and
calamity  more  evident  than  in  flood-stricken
Manila throughout the 1970s and early 1980s
when Imelda Marcos, in her capacity as Metro
Manila Governor, was in charge. It was against
a  background  of  physical  devastation  and
flooding  in  July  1972  caused  by  Typhoon
Gloring, that a 500 million pesos Calamity Fund
Bill  was  eventually  passed  through  the
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Philippine  House  of  Representatives  and
Senate.  No one knew exactly  when the next
extreme typhoon or flood would hit the capital
and create a national disaster on economic and
humanitarian grounds. But once the Calamity
Fund Bill was law, the President, his First lady
and their party would control and manipulate
the  use  of  the  500 million  pesos  relief  fund
primarily  for  their  political  purposes  and
personal self interest. The bloated emergency
relief fund would enable them not only to pay
serious  attention  to  the  handling  of  future
typhoon crises but also to win political support
and elections in the process too. Indeed, from a
purely  political  standpoint,  Ferdinand  and
Imelda Marcos and their political backers were
the prime beneficiaries of the Calamity Fund
measure.
Background: The Marcos Years
This paper examines the impact of typhoons,
which  cause  floods  resulting  in  widespread
death and damage, as a key political aspect in
the thinking and administration of the Marcos
government.  The impact of  a typhoon-related
natural  disaster  on  Philippine  society  and
politics in the 1970s depended upon two sets of
factors:  namely,  the  political  and  material
capacity  of  the  government  to  react  to  the
disaster  and  the  relevant  aspects  of  the
political culture. These include: the extent to
which the responsibility of preparing for and
dealing  with  a  disaster  is  specific  and
understood; the citizen’s previous perceptions
of  the  government  and the  degree  to  which
they change their perceptions; and the extent
to  which  a  natural  disaster  is  considered  to
have a legitimate political value.
On 21 September 1972, several months after
the enormous tragedy called Typhoon Gloring
had  swept  across  the  archipelago,  President
Marcos, who had been elected in 1965, and re-
elected in 1969, declared martial law. He acted
not  specifically  because  of  the  typhoon,  but
rather  because  of  widespread  economic
uncertainty,  the  threat  of  rebellion  in  the
countryside  and  possible  succession  in
Mindanao.  Marcos  launched  a  radical  new
social agenda under the provisions of martial
law. He established new government structures
and  agencies,  abolished  others  previously
responsible  for  planning  and  execution  of
economic  functions,  and  implemented  a
revolutionary social welfare programme aimed
at  restructuring  society.  In  1972,  he  also
introduced  a  strategy  of  balanced  economic
growth  and  a  genuine  agrarian  reform
programme. His ‘new society’ was to be based
on  an  innovative  system of  government  that
would respond to the needs of ordinary people,
w h i c h  h e  c a l l e d  ‘ c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
authoritarianism’. 5
Figure 1. Famous photograph of the late
Philippine  President  Marcos  declaring
martial  law  (21  September  1972).
Source.  Robert  JA  Basilio  Jr,  ‘Five  things
Donald Draper and Ferdinand Marcos have in
common,’  Jack  The  Scribbler  (9  September
2 0 1 2 ) ,  o n l i n e :
http://jackthescribbler.com/2010/01/five-things-
donald-draper-and-ferdinand-marcos-have-in-
common/, accessed 14 August 2013.
Marcos, however, was unsuccessful in curbing
the widespread political influence and activity
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of  the  old  economic  oligarchs,  who  skilfully
survived Marcos’ onslaught to reform ‘the sick
old  society’.6  The  new society  was  meant  to
redistribute wealth and property, but the old
oligarchs soon joined forces with others who
had gained access to the levers of  economic
power  as  a  direct  consequence  of  the  new
society. By the mid-1970s, the politics of the
transition from the old to the new society was
to prove far more difficult and complex than
Ferdinand  Marcos  had  anticipated  and  his
authoritarian rule served to both intensify ‘the
increasingly  negative  impact  of  clientelism’7
and constrain the ‘beneficial effects of foreign
loans  and  aid  on  the  community.’8  Indeed,
Cheng-tian  Kuo  suggests  that  ‘foreign  loans
have been regarded by political leaders as easy
money for rewarding their clients.’9
Figure 2. Sunday Express front page after
Marcos  declared  martial  law (September
1972).
Source. Maytpapa, ‘A Childhood in the Time of
Martial Law, Society Magazine (22 September
2 0 1 1 ) ,  o n l i n e :
http://en.paperblog.com/a-childhood-in-the-time
-of-martial-law-69557/,  accessed  14  August
2012.
As  ‘the  overcentralised  government  under
military  rule  began  to  atrophy,’  David
Timbermann  explains  that  ‘favouritism  and
veniality  became  rampant’  and  the  economy
was adversely affected by ‘mounting corruption
and mismanagement.’10 Amelia P. Varela claims
that both ‘graft and corruption reached its all
time  high  [and]  permeated  most  aspects  of
bureaucratic life and institutions which saw the
start of the systematic plunder of the country.’11
Indeed,  under  Marcos,  both  corruption  and
money  laundering  formed  a  ‘symbiotic
relationship,’12 that was reliant on the Marcos
government  retaining  power.  Typhoon-based
disasters  gave  his  administration  ample
opportunity to both tout for political supremacy
at the expense of the opposition and to add to
his mounting personal wealth.
In  the  post-war  period,  the  Philippines
experienced  high  rates  of  population  growth
and a level of rural-urban migration of five per
cent  persisted  throughout  the  1960s.  The
reluctance and/or inability of the landed elite to
remedy serious social and economic problems
in the provinces,  so evident in the failure of
agrarian  reform,  led  to  ever-higher  levels  of
rural-urban  migration,  especially  to  Manila.
The population of the archipelago grew from
eleven million in 1948 to 27 million in 1960 and
to almost 37 million by 1970; by then one third
of the population, which had almost doubled in
less  than  a  quarter  of  a  century,  was
concentrated  in  Manila  and  nine  adjoining
provinces  on  Luzon.13  This  exacerbated  the
already  long-standing  socio-economic
marginalisation  of  the  masses.
In Manila, migrants were largely absorbed into
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various  low-income  service  occupations.  The
majority  of  these new urbanites  in  the early
1970s  belonged  to  Manila’s  lower  class,  or
slum society.  They generally lacked technical
skills  and  took  up  occupations  as  domestic
servants, labourers, hawkers, jeepney drivers,
entertainers,  or  prostitutes  and  they  filled
minor clerical positions and owned virtually no
residential property in the city.14
The exponential growth of the population and
the rate of rural-urban migration exerted added
pressure  upon  an  already  inadequate  public
sanitation system and thereby increased health
hazards,  especially  the  possible  outbreak  of
diarrheal  diseases  due  to  storm-related
flooding. Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos would
attempt to establish local programs for public
sanitation and health (refuse, litter, water and
sewage pollution) to transform Manila into a
clean  and  beautiful  city  that  would  attract
tourism  and  trans-national  capital.  Besides
construction of world-class hotels,  convention
and  cultural  centres,  they  established  some
well-equipped hospitals and clinics staffed with
skilled  physicians  and  nurses.  Chain  drug
stores  were  also  located  in  strategic  places
near the hospitals, schools, shopping malls and
heavy-commuting areas. But, the nameless and
faceless  urban  poor,  who  lived  in  their
thousands in squatter communities along the
esteros, were not part of the Marcos campaign
and programs to embellish the face of Manila.
There was a cruel contradiction, albeit irony,
between the generally clean, quiet and orderly
atmosphere proclaimed in travel  guides,  tour
advertisements  and  billboards,  depicting
Manila  as  a  global  city  where  economic
progress  went  hand  in  hand  with  the
developing social reality of a burgeoning rural-
urban migrant population. Many of the globe-
trotting  tourists  and  overseas  executives
visiting  the  city’s  business  district  were  not
fully aware of the scope and rate of the adverse
changes that were taking place in Manila, as
the metropolis  rapidly grew and poor people
struggled to cope with its consequences. But
the  government-sponsored  promotion  of  the
remarkable transformation of the city, from a
previously alarming and deteriorating place to
a vibrant, expanding metropole proved a cruel
illusion—a  false  dream—for  the  tens  of
thousands of squatters confronting the problem
of a lack of housing and related health impacts,
in  one  of  the  third  world’s  fastest  growing
cities. Most of the comfortably-housed wealthy
locals  and  foreign  visitors  rarely  went
anywhere near the burgeoning slum quarters of
the city.  But Makati’s tree-lined avenues and
glass-lined skyscrapers cast shadows across the
makeshift houses of squatters from rural areas
living at overcrowded addresses that did not
appear  in  in fo rmat ion  prov ided  on
recommended tours and general guide maps.
The  migrants  from the  provinces  threatened
with homelessness dwelled out of sight of the
path  of  the  capital’s  crushing  progress,  but
they  lived  within  its  interstices  and  in
vulnerable  areas;  low-lying  neighbourhoods
often sited directly in the path of typhoons and
prone to flooding.
Figure 3. Marginal urban enclave of Siteo
Baseco, Tondo.
S o u r c e .  O n l i n e :
http://farm3.static.flickr.com/2611/3738095867
_81ec1e7611.jpg,  accessed  14  August  2013;
cited  in  Doracie  B.  Zoleta‐Nantes,  ‘Disasters
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and  megacities:  critical  geographies  of  flood
hazards & social inequities in the case of Metro
Manila,’  seminar  paper  716.pdf  (Canberra:
Crawford  School,  College  of  Asia  and  the
Pacific,  the  Australian  National  University,
n.d.).
Storms: A Chronology: 1970s–1980s
Here,  I  want  to  examine  the  interactive
relationship between the spate of typhoons and
f l o o d s  i n  t h e  1 9 7 0 s  a n d  e a r l y
1980s—particularly Typhoon Gloring—and the
nature of politics and the subsequent political
crises, and, how the political environment and
a  natural  disaster  can  interact  with  one
another.15  The typhoons of  the 1970s caused
chaos  across  the  archipelago,  cutting  power
lines,  disrupting  trade  and  transport  and
displacing hundreds of thousands of people. In
the  early  1970s,  the  Philippines  received  its
strongest warning yet that shifts in climate and
weather patterns were creating the likelihood
of a turbulent future of more intense storms
and devastating floods with mass destruction
and displacement.  The warnings began when
Typhoon  Meding  crossed  Luzon  on  Monday
morning, 31 August 1970. It rained for almost a
week after which greater Manila, and central
and  southern  Luzon  were  under  water  for
weeks. Less than three months later, Typhoon
Yoling  hit  Manila  on  19  November  1970.
However,  when  Typhoon  Gloring  devastated
Luzon between 10 and 25 July 1972, the entire
nation  was  struck  by  the  tragedy.  Typhoon
Norming,  struck  between  15  and  16  August
1974,  and  Typhoon  Didang,  came  along
between 16 and 27 May 1976 and yet again
Manila was flooded. Typhoon Yaning hit central
Luzon on 9 October 1978 (see Table 1).
Year Date Typhoon
1970 31 August Meding
1970 19 November Yoling
1972 10–25 July Gloring
1974 15–16 August Norming
1976 16–27 May Didang
1978 9 October Yaning
1984 August June
1984 September Ike
Table  1.  List  of  typhoons  in  the  1970s  and
1980s that caused
chaos  across  the  archipelago  during  the
presidency  of  Marcos.
By the early 1980s,  the economic and social
impacts  of  typhoons  added  to  the  mounting
political  pressure  against  the  increasingly
beleaguered government of Ferdinand Marcos.
Two typhoons, in August and September 1984,
unleashed  the  worst  calamities  to  hit  the
archipelago in fourteen years.  Typhoon June,
which  hit  the  northern  Philippines  in  late
August, and Typhoon Ike, which lashed a wide
area of the central and southern Philippines a
few days later, killed 1556 people, injured more
than one thousand and left  more  than 1500
missing.16 In its rampage across the southern
Philippines, Typhoon Ike left 200,000 homeless
as houses were either flattened or blown away
by high winds or destroyed by floods. Schools
were similarly affected. Although the officially
confirmed death toll on 4 September was 332,
the  Mayor  of  Surigao,  Constantino  Navarro,
stated  that  one  thousand  people  had  been
killed in his city alone. He told reporters that
the city had run out of coffins and embalming
fluid and had to bury the dead in mass graves
in an effort to prevent the spread of disease.17
It is set against this background of President
Marcos attempting to radically transform the
political system after 1972 that Filipinos could
not afford to think about the climate and recent
weather phenomena as necessarily unchanging
or  ‘normal’.  The  weather,  like  politics,  was
susceptible  to  change.  Marcos  and  the
personnel  of  the  Philippine  Weather  Bureau,
particularly Dr. Ramon Kintanar, its youthful,
articulate director, were to painfully learn that
the weather of the 1970s was not typical of the
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previous fifty years—and its patterns were even
less typical of the previous several centuries. In
fact, climate and weather throughout the 1970s
proved to be more variable and unpredictable
than that of the decades just prior to 1970, to
further complicate matters.
Weather  services  had  been  neglected  by  a
succession  of  post-war  governments  so  the
Bureau could not initiate development projects,
purchase new equipment or hire more trained
personnel.18  However,  on  8  December  1972,
President Marcos, now all too painfully aware
of the tremendous importance of the weather
services  and  all ied  seismological  and
astronomical activities to national development,
passed an act abolishing the Weather Bureau
and  in  its  place,  established  the  Philippine
Atmospheric,  Geophysical  and  Astronomical
Services  and  Administration  (PAGASA).  The
PAGASA  was  entrusted  with  ‘providing
environmental  protection  and  utilising
scientific knowledge as an effective instrument
to ensure the safety, well-being and economic
security of all the people, and for the promotion
of  national  progress.’19  Most  importantly,
administrative  control  of  the  agency  was
transferred from the Department of Commerce
and  Industry  to  the  Department  of  National
Defence.
Both  Kintanar  and  Marcos  hoped  that  the
coming years would prove truly remarkable for
the scientific and technological development of
meteorology  and  reliable  operational
forecasting across the islands. As part of the
Marcos government’s high modernist  project,
PAGASA had gone digital  and meteorological
scientists would use satellite transmissions and
sophisticated  computer  models  to  study  and
‘tame’  the  typhoon.  PAGASA  began  to
undertake  a  broad-risk  mapping  of  typhoons
and  f l ood -p rone  a reas  began  t o  be
identified—based on topography and historical
rainfall patterns.20
Storms and Floods: Impact
The typhoons and floods of the 1970s brought
the national ‘quick-fix’ relief aid syndrome to
Manila  and  right  to  the  sometime-flooded
doorsteps of the seat of power at Malacanang
Palace.  The  Marcos  regime,  from  a  purely
political  standpoint,  could  only  think  about
short-term  effects,  rather  than  thinking  and
operating on longer-term environmental scales
in dealing with urban flooding as a serious and
growing development challenge for Manila.
At  the height of  Typhoon Gloring,  Ferdinand
and Imelda Marcos blamed a particular sector
of the urban poor for not having a basic human
asset, namely shelter and a bit of land to till.
They had failed to solve the long and troubled
history  of  agrarian  land reform and in  their
attempts remake society from the bottom up
blamed  some  of  the  desperate  peasants
arriving  in  Manila,  seeking  a  safe  roof  over
their  heads  and  good  fortune.  The  massive
influx of landless, destitute migrants to Manila
and  the  prol i feration  of  shanty-town
developments  had  led  to  canals  and  water-
catchment areas being swallowed up and built
on  by  the  urban  poor.  Marcos  blamed  the
incessant storm-related flooding on garbage in
the choked esteros and swollen creeks blocking
the city’s  sewers.  He appealed to  the  urban
poor  not  to  clog  up  the  canals  and  sewage
systems with their refuse. But, in reality, the
social  and  environmental  impacts  of  the
Typhoon  Gloring  floods  in  Manila  were  a
microcosm of a much larger national problem.
There was not adequate affordable housing and
employment  for  the  displaced  migrant  poor
from  the  provinces.  Hence,  they  built  their
houses and shacks out of necessity in a pell-
mell manner without concern for degrading the
surrounding  environment—an  environment
where regulation had been equally ignored by
the kingpins of the construction industry, the
principal  real-estate  speculators  and  the
industrial  strongmen  who  ran  the  local
factories  with  complete  disregard  for  Metro
Manila’s  environment,  but  especially  for  the
Pasig River, irrigated rice paddies and water
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catchment areas. These economically powerful
groups,  far  more  so  than the  poor  migrants
from  rural  areas,  were  creating  ever  larger
‘ecological  footprints’  around  Manila  which
were not, in the long run, sustainable. Marcos
certainly  was  serious  about  introducing  an
ethic  of  environmental  responsibility  but
primarily for political reasons. In a pragmatic
attempt  to  direct  attention  away  from  the
developing impacts of his cronies’  ‘ecological
footprints’  in  Manila  and  beyond,  he
calculatingly blamed the esteros dwellers and
urban poor.
Centuries  earlier,  when  floods  washed  over
Manila,  the  water  would  ordinarily  subside
within a few days. Now, in the 1970s, with so
much of the capital under asphalt, the sewers
crumbling  and  developers  having  built  over
vital soak ways, the water was trapped. During
these years, as with the Filipino public at large,
Mani la’s  c i t izens  were  not  given  the
opportunity  to  be  directly  involved  in  the
planning  and  redistribution  of  typhoon  and
flood relief aid that would drastically affect the
future of their lives for better or worse.
The urban congestion caused by the post-war
migration as livelihoods and natural resources
disappeared  in  the  islands,  had  led  to  the
development  of  squatter  communities  on
marshy  lowlands,  vacant  lots  or  unused
agricultural land close to Manila.  The shanty
housing was highly individual, substandard and
often  constructed  from  salvaged  materials,
including  scrap  metal,  discarded  timber  and
cardboard. Water for cooking and drinking had
to  be  hauled  from  distant  standpipes,  and
kerosene was generally used for lighting and
fuel.  Garbage  and  human  waste  were  often
disposed of in drainage ditches, nearby bays or
rivers close to where the makeshift structures
had been erected.21
Every year during the typhoon season (July to
November) President Marcos controlled a city
that swam in filth. Large areas of Manila were
sited  on  low-lying  land,  generally  below sea
level,  and  the  fetid  streets  were  prone  to
flooding.  At  the  same  time,  some  firms  and
factories were simply dumping untreated waste
into  nearby  water  systems;  the  very  same
systems that  were being used to sustain the
mushrooming  migrant  population.  Unlike  the
nineteenth  century  when  the  water  drained
away  unimpeded,  the  typhoon-driven  floods
from the 1970s onwards not only inundated the
many new slum and squatter communities but
also  many middle-class  residential  complexes
and the lingering polluted waters could take
weeks to subside.
Delays in the implementation of a flood-control
project  in  Metro  Manila  in  the  aftermath  of
Typhoon Gloring had driven the project cost up
from the original estimate of 236 million pesos
to  nearly  one  billion  pesos.  This  estimate
covered  only  the  infrastructure  aspect  of  an
envisaged  three-billion-pesos  flood-control
project. Various sources besides the congress
had been tapped to raise the necessary funds
for  a  flood-control  system,  including  a  0.25
peso  tax  on  cinema  goers,  a  proposed  one-
eighth of one per cent real estate tax, a floating
casino and the sale of one billion pesos worth of
reclaimed land  in  the  Manila  Bay  area.  The
movie tax had generated over 50 million pesos
since  December  1972,  but  Metro  Manila
residents did not reap its benefits. The floods
got worse year by year. But from the standpoint
of political economy, flood-control was essential
for Metro Manila which accounted for almost
half  the  country’s  Gross  National  Product
(GNP).22
By  1976,  workers  had  started  to  remove
obstacles which blocked the flow of floodwater
along the esteros,  drainage mains  and other
outlets into the Pasig River and Manila Bay.
Unfortunately, the floods triggered by Typhoon
Didang  in  May  1976  came  before  the
completion of work on three pumping stations
for the Metro Manila area, which would serve
as major outlets for waters coming from the
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areas  of  Quiapo,  Sampaloc,  San  Miguel  and
nearby places. The city’s only other pumping
station (the fourth one), recently inaugurated,
was  temporarily  rendered  useless  by  water
lilies that clogged its outlet to the Pasig River.
Typhoon Didang’s impact highlighted the lack
of drainage, operational pumping stations and
the dire necessity of establishing a new fund
for the flood-control system.23
General Government Responses: Ferdinand
Marcos
Greg Bankoff, in his exploration of the politics
of recent natural disasters in the Philippines,
has  investigated  the  correlation  between
natural  disasters  and  the  way  power  and
wealth  are  articulated  in  the  Philippines.24
Under Marcos the convergence of interests and
activities leading to control of the pattern and
personnel  involved  in  the  administration  of
available  disaster  relief  was a  blatant,  albeit
complex,  political  issue  and  problem,  which
involved bureaucrats, military personnel, entire
communities, trans-national donors and market
interests. Bankoff notes in his discussion of the
way some people  profited  at  the  expense  of
others from the impacts of a natural disaster,
that extreme typhoons, like Gloring, provided
an ideal opportunity for Marcos supporters to
politically  grandstand  and  financially  profit
f rom  the  s i tuat ion.  They  personal ly
redistributed  relief  materials  to  their
constituencies  while  taking  full  advantage of
the widespread devastation and deprivation to
attack  political  opponents  in  similarly
threatened communities for their seeming lack
of  assistance.  The  manipulation  of  disaster-
relief funds by the Marcos politicians, and their
ability to reap political and social capital from
their risk management of floods, depended to a
certain extent on the control and manipulation
of the media. As Bankoff notes, in such states of
emergency, ‘Political concern with the victims
of natural disasters tends to follow the same
ebb  and  flow  as  that  of  the  media:  much
concern  and  many  promises  during  the  first
days of rescue and relief but waning political
support during the hard years of reconstruction
and rehabilitation that follow.’25
A  typhoon  or  flood  disaster  could  turn  an
impoverished region characterised by scarcity
into a ‘disaster boom economy’.26 A classic case
in  point  was  Typhoon  Meding.  Marcos’
handling  of  this  typhoon  and  the  associated
floods  helped  revive  his  flagging  political
fortunes prior to the declaration of martial law.
The  winds  o f  Typhoon  Meding  were
comparatively  mild,  but  unrelenting  rain  for
five  days  caused  damaging  floods.  On  2
September  1970,  greater  Manila  and central
Luzon  suffered  widespread  devastation,
economic damage and loss of human lives due
to  the  torrential  rains.  In  the  thick  of  it  all
President Marcos could be seen appearing on
television,  announcing  a  state  of  emergency
and mobilising government  rescue and relief
efforts, promising flood-control projects to the
people,  and  ordering  the  release  of  300,000
pesos to  the social  welfare administration to
finance relief  operations.  The First  Lady and
Bong  Bong  Marcos  went  on  the  road,
personally  distributing  relief  goods.  At  the
same  time,  Manila’s  Mayor  Villegas  was
desperately  asking  the  municipal  boards  for
power to borrow funds so he could implement a
flood-control project to protect his own city.27
Scores of people were stricken with influenza,
gastro-enteritis,  pneumonia,  diphtheria  and
diarrhoea,  with  a  60  per  cent  increase  in
hospital admissions. Government agencies and
the departments of  National  Defence,  Health
and  Public  Works  and  Communication  were
mobilised  by  the  President.  Marcos  looked
decisive and sympathetic as he provided rapid,
albeit  selective,  operational  assistance.  The
President  was  reported  as  stating  that  his
government would look into ways and means of
finding  immediate  remedial  measures  to
alleviate the appalling living conditions of many
rural  and  urban  people,  particularly  those
displaced  by  the  floods.28  Politically  this
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rhetoric and grandstanding seemed convincing.
It signified not only firm leadership, but also
the fact that he was taking a strategic approach
in dealing with the unfolding crisis. In addition,
he involved the full range of key stakeholders
in  the  disaster  mediation  and relief  process.
The  armed  forces  were  mobilised  at  the
President’s  behest.  In  central  Luzon,  10,000
military men were alerted for relief and rescue
operations. Army trucks evacuated flood-bound
residents, navy divers scoured the flood waters
for  the  missing,  government  relief  agencies
were placed on high alert and the Red Cross
and  civic  organisations  established  relief
centres  all  over  Manila—but  the  overseas
donated and government funds did not always
reach the intended recipients. Instead, against
this  background  of  a  proclaimed  state  of
calamity,  the  conservative-run  Marcos
administration was the prime beneficiary both
economically and politically.
People candidly pointed out that the calamity
had  favoured  the  conservative  moneyed
candidates  for  the  impending  Constitutional
Convention.  As  one  commentator  suggested,
‘Indeed  some  candidates  and  their  spouses,
never known for their social conscience, were
suddenly flapping all  over the stricken areas
with the solicitousness of vultures.’29  Charges
also  flew back and forth  that  certain  vested
political  interests  were hoarding relief  goods
for  release  at  the  approach of  elections,  for
very  obvious  reasons.  For  a  month,  the dire
state of Luzon and the Philippine economy, the
dominant theme of the impending election in
the  aftermath  of  Typhoon  Meding,  was
constantly discussed by the media in regard to
the President’s decisive role in mounting relief
operations to manage the risk of floods. Marcos
took  pains  to  ensure  that  his  ‘political’
intervention caused by Meding’s impacts lasted
until  the  elections.  But  the  Presidents
operational  actions  and  selective  assistance
over urban flooding were not appreciated by
his weakened political opponents.
 
Figure 4. Category 4 super typhoon Yoling,
14  November–22  November  1970,  peak
in t en s i t y ,  250  km /h  ( 155  mph )
(Saffir–Simpson  hurricane  wind  scale,
SSHS).
Source.  ‘Typhoon  Patsy  (Yoling),’  Wikipedia,
o n l i n e :
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1970_Pacific_typh
oon_season#Typhoon_Patsy_.28Yoling.29,
accessed 14 August 2013.
A confident Marcos, consequently was not so
concerned  or  solicitous  several  months  later
when Typhoon Yoling (Patsy) struck on a cold
grey November day in 1970 (see Figures 4 and
5).  As the weather worsened,  Ferdinand and
Imelda Marcos took the Burmese General Ne
Win and Madame Ne Win to Baguio by train
because  the  approaching  typhoon  did  not
permit them to fly. While Yoling was rampaging
across Manila, Marcos and the General played
golf on the Mansion house course.30 It became
apparent  that  the  President,  First  Lady  and
their guests were to remain ignorant and, at
times, seemingly unconcerned about the plight
of  the  people  of  Manila  and  the  outlying
provinces, as the typhoon took a terrible toll in
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lives  and  property.  In  the  aftermath  of  the
disaster,  the  government  would  be  harshly
criticised for its callous attitude and failure to
act rapidly and decisively, and one of the least
successful  emergency-  rescue  efforts  ever
mounted in the Marcos years must be counted
as a major political blunder.
Rather than oversee immediate management of
the  disaster  himself,  the  President  put  the
Executive  Secretary  and  Assistant  Executive
Secretary in  charge of  the operation on this
occasion. Only after his round of golf with Ne
Win had been completed, did Marcos belatedly
issue  a  proclamation  declaring  a  state  of
calamity in Manila, Caloocan, Quezon City and
Pasay.  This  delay  was  to  prove  costly.
Thousands of government employees and other
citizens  were  stranded  in  Quiapo  and  Santa
Cruz because the government had not declared
a  no-work  day.  Repeated  appeals  for  army
trucks to ferry the stranded employees away
from the flood-affected areas went unheeded.
The association of private contractors who had
offered to help Defence Secretary Juan Ponce
Enrile  coordinate  the  relief  effort  was  left
facing  no  decision.  Meanwhile,  Marcos  was
finally advised about the scale of the death and
destruction  left  by  the  extreme typhoon.  He
arrived back in Manila on 20 November and
called an emergency meeting of key officials at
the  headquarters  of  the  National  Defense
Coordinating  Council  (NDCC)  at  Camp
Aguinaldo  at  noon.  After  being  briefed  he
signed the proclamation, declaring a state of
calamity  and  allocated  100,000  pesos  for
calamity  relief.31
Caption:  Figure  5.  Track  of  Typhoon
Yoling,  showing  proximity  to  Manila.
Source.  ‘Typhoon  Patsy  (Yoling),’  Wikipedia,
o n l i n e :
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Patsy_1970_tr
ack.png, accessed 14 August 2013.
He  was  not  to  make  the  same  political
misjudgement  again.  On 12 July  1972,  when
Typhoon  Gloring  struck,  President  Marcos
immediately declared a state of calamity in the
entire  Luzon  region  and  recommended  to
Congress the urgent passage of a 250-million
pesos  calamity  fund  measure.  But  his
recommendations fell  on deaf ears. However,
both the deafening silence and indifference in
Congress  to  the  proposed  250-million  peso
calamity  fund  lasted  only  five  days,  when
Typhoon Gloring re-entered the islands with a
vengeance. Over the next seven days President
Marcos personally directed the massive relief
and rehabilitation efforts that were undertaken
by the national government. The swift decisions
made by  Marcos  beginning on  19 July  1972
included:
ordering  the  immediate  release  of  3
million  pesos  representing  the  unspent
balance  of  the  Presidential  Calamity
Fund in the previous year’s budget and
taking  ful l  responsibil ity  of  this
apparently  illegal  act,  as  there was no
budget  yet  to  sanction  any  release  of
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public  funds  during  the  current  fiscal
year;
seeking help of foreign governments to
provide additional relief goods;
conducting several aerial surveys of the
disaster areas;
ordering  the  commandeering  of  all
available  food  supplies  and  private
transport facilities in certain locations as
emergency measures to help government
relief agencies;
warning  greater  Manila  that  if  food
prices  continued to  increase,  he would
take  the  same  drastic  measures  as  in
Luzon;
converting  the  Maharlika  Hall  of
Malacanang into an emergency hospital
for ailing flood victims;
temporarily  transferring  the  seat  of
government to Pangasinan.32
Marcos had also ordered the suspension of the
distribution  of  relief  in  Pampanga  and  the
diversion of  these goods to Pangasinan flood
sufferers. These relief operations had been no
more  than  a  trickle,  squeezed  out  of  the
province’s  own  meagre  and  fast-dwindling
supplies, before Marcos abruptly shifted relief
operations away from Pampanga. On Saturday
night,  23 July 1972, the navy transport,  RPS
Surigao  del  Norte  and  its  cargo  of  clothes,
foodstuffs and medicines was the first to cast
anchor  off  Lingayen.  The  arrival  of  the  first
relief  ship  sparked  squabbles  over  the
disposition of  the  cargo of  rice  amongst  the
province’s  incumbent  and  aspiring  political
leaders.  On  Tuesday  2  August,  two  more
transport ships, British and American, docked
with 110,000 pounds of relief goods, securing
Pangisanan’s  relief  supplies.  By  then  the
President had flown in with a team of national
officials; a tent was set up near the Lingayen
airstrip  and  with  it  came  more  promises  of
funds for Pangasinan.33 The politically grateful
loyal  supporters  of  Pangasinan  began  a
miraculously  fast  recovery  from their  misery
under the watchful eye of their President who
made sure they received relief funds and food
aid that neighbouring Pampanga—further south
on the road to Manila—was denied.
Furthermore,  Marcos  act ivated  four
government departments to bring help to the
victims of Typhoon Gloring: the departments of
National Defence, Health, Social Welfare and
Public Works. Threats of an El Tor epidemic in
Pangasinan confronted  Marcos,34  who,  on  24
July 1972, immediately took steps to avert the
spread  of  the  disease.  He  ordered  station
hospitals  to  be  established  in  various
towns—just  one  of  a  series  of  measures
adopted to prevent the spread of El Tor, gastro-
enteritis  and  bronchial  diseases  that  usually
follow in the wake of floods and typhoons.35 The
Health  Department  carried  out  mass
inoculation  against  El  Tor,  other  strains  of
cholera and typhoid in central  Luzon. At the
same time Marcos ordered a physical inventory
of  rice  and  other  food  stored  in  private
warehouses. He directed the seizure of rice and
food stocks in private warehouses if the owners
refused to sell to flood victims at prices fixed by
the Price Control Council.
In addition, the President quickly moved to tap
foreign  loans  for  the  repair  of  major  public
works  projects.  He  directed  the  Finance
Secretary  to  prepare  an  estimate  of  the
necessary matching funds for  a  $300 million
loan from a consortium of world bankers. The
President  stated  in  an  interview  that  the
counterpart  fund  could  be  as  much  as  1.8
billion pesos under the usual requirement that
it should be at least 60 per cent of the proposed
loan. The loan, when secured, would be repaid
over a number of years. Marcos explained, ‘The
situation is so desperate and explosive and the
reason I say this is because we have not yet
seen the end of the rainy and typhoon season,
and there may yet be deficiencies this year in
food, medicines and services.’36
Four years later, on 20 May 1976, four days
after  Typhoon  Didang  had  struck,  Marcos
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proclaimed a state of calamity in Metro Manila,
Quezon Province and the Bikol region, in order
to ensure rapid selective distribution of relief
goods  and  assistance  and  maintain  stable
prices  of  prime  commodities.  The  President
made  the  announcement  at  an  emergency
meeting  of  top  government  officials  and
military  officers.  He  reassured  the  Filipino
people  that  everything  in  their  power  was
being done to  assist  them.  He advised flood
victims  to  stay  indoors  unless  performing
essential  functions  or  relief  work.  The  First
Lady,  as  Metro  Manila  Governor,  said  there
was enough food in the greater metropolitan
area and that government agencies were doing
their best to prevent hoarding.37 She also asked
Manila  mayors  and  her  action  staff  on
infrastructure  and  flood  control  to  submit  a
rapid assessment of the extent of the flooding
and  damage,  so  immediate  recovery  steps
could be formulated and taken.  Orders were
given to remove all illegal constructions, such
as fish ponds, along riverbanks and esteros and
prosecute  those  responsible  for  water
obstruction and drainage problems. As in the
case  of  Typhoon  Gloring,  the  President  and
F i r s t  L a d y  l o o k e d  d e c i s i v e  a n d
sympathetic—both  on  the  spot  and  on
television. 3 8
The Philippines experienced severe storms and
flooding  throughout  the  1970s  that  led  to
hundreds of millions of dollars worth of damage
in Manila and the neighbouring islands to the
south. In 1978, President Marcos took a cold
hard look at  the  national  recovery  effort,  or
lack  of  it.  The  promulgation  of  Presidential
Decree (PD) No.  1566 that  year  created the
National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC)
which  provided  for  ‘Strengthening  the
Philippine  Disaster  Control  Capability  and
Establishing  the  National  Program  on
Community  Disaster  Preparedness.’39  The
NDCC,  under  Marcos’  rule,  automatically
became  the  highest  policy-making,  decision-
making  and  coordinating  body  for  disaster
management in the Philippines.
Typhoons  June  (August  1984)  and  Ike
(September 1984), which lashed a wide area of
the central and southern Philippines, unleashed
the worst calamities to hit the archipelago in
fourteen  years.  In  a  delivered  broadcast  on
Tuesday 5 September 1984, President Marcos
asked his nation, to forget its differences and
concentrate  fully  on  rescue  efforts.  He  said,
Typhoon Ike was ‘one of the most severe that
the  nation  has  experienced  in  decades…the
total toll at this time is hundreds, I hope not
thousands  dead.’40  The  First  Lady  flew  to
stricken  areas  in  the  Visayas  and  Mindanao
regions.  The  Presidential  Palace  announced
that she surveyed the destruction and directed
distribution  of  relief  goods.  A  week  after
Marcos’ television speech, the eruption of the
Mayon Volcano, 250 miles southeast of Manila,
which forced the evacuation of 20,000 people,
added to the pressures on the Marcos regime
and Manila.  Ash fallout  and mud flows from
rain caused extensive damage to crops in the
area and the displacement of a rural populace
on a large scale.
The  besieged  government  cal led  for
international assistance. Again, several million
dollars  in  foreign  relief  aid  poured  into  the
Philippines  to  help  the  estimated 2.4  million
people affected by the typhoons and volcanic
eruption.  But  the  Marcos  administration
requested even more international  assistance
in order to cope with the scope and magnitude
of  the  crisis.  Diplomatic  sources  in  Manila,
however,  publicly  stated  that  given  the
unstable  economic  environment  in  the
Philippines, there was a possibility that relief
aid  would  be  diverted  and  not  reach  the
victims.  Marcos  officials  denied  this  could
happen  and  several  countries  immediately
responded to the desperate call for assistance.
Specific  Government  Responses:  Imelda
Marcos
Many long-term root causes were to blame in
part  for  the  calamitous  circumstances
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surrounding  the  succession  of  disastrous
cyclonic storms of the 1970s and early 1980s.
However,  the  rapid  population  growth  and
urbanisation  of  Manila  in  the  Marcos  years
outstripped the paltry amounts that had been
earmarked in the annual budget to assist policy
makers and technical specialists deal with flood
control in a rapidly expanding city. The money
available  covered  only  a  limited  amount  of
dredging  of  the  Pasig  River  and  some
improvements  to  the  drainage  system  and
infrastructure  that  linked  the  polluted  river,
flowing at a snail’s pace through the heart of
the capital, to Manila Bay.
Imelda Marcos was constantly in the public eye
throughout these years making relief visits to
storm-  and  flood-affected  areas  and  to  the
NDCC at Camp Aguinaldo. Flooded sites were
checked,  as  were  emergency  centres  being
readied  for  the  relief  and  rehabilitation  of
typhoon and flood victims. Relief goods were
constantly  solicited  from  the  private  sector.
During Typhoon Norming, 15–16 August 1974,
Mrs Marcos went personally to the NDCC to
oversee  operations  in  neighbouring  affected
provinces.  She  ordered  the  distribution  of
seeds for planting be speeded up, particularly
in  central  Luzon.  She  also  inquired  into  the
implementation  of  drainage and flood-control
measures. She asked staff at Camp Aguinaldo
to  send  medical  teams  immediately  to  the
flooded  areas  in  greater  Manila  and  central
Luzon.41  While  the  First  Lady  occasionally
received  a  chilly  welcome  from  residents
suffering from hunger and disease,  generally
flood  victims  in  the  worst-affected  places
welcomed her with open arms, as if she was
their  saviour.  The  repeated  relief  operations
and  measures  she  personally  mounted  to
resolve  the  flood  crises  in  Manila,  primarily
caused  by  typhoon-related  rains  and  poor
drainage,  suggested  there  was  a  powerful
political imposition of will and concern on her
part  to  pragmatically  act,  and  as  quickly  as
possible, to resolve particular local crises.
In May 1976, when Typhoon Didang was fast
approaching, Imelda Marcos rallied the private
sector  and  citizenry  to  help  alleviate  the
suffering of those who would be badly affected
by the floods. She also expressed hope that the
emergency would ‘give every citizen,  rich or
poor, a sense of responsibility so that we may
not  aggravate  natural  flood  handicaps  by
unwitting action.’42 She then spent most of that
night  and  the  following  morning  monitoring
reports from the NDCC and emergency relief
operations mobilised by barangay units in the
Metro Manila area.43
In the years following Didang, when typhoons
raked  Manila,  Mrs  Marcos  would  personally
direct the relief work in afflicted areas. For the
thousands  annually  rendered  homeless  by
waist-level  contaminated  flood  waters,  the
figure of the First Lady organising medicine,
food and other relief goods for distribution in
Metro Manila’s social welfare and evacuation
centres became a common sight. Hence, when
Typhoon Yaning hit central Luzon on 9 October
1978,  Imelda Marcos mobilised all  barangay-
based disaster brigades to assist. She asked the
barangay  captains  to  coordinate  all  their
activities with their respective mayors. Metro
Manila officials and other action officers were
in  constant  touch  with  various  barangay
coordinators and the mayors from the Metro
Manila  Coordinating  Operations  Center,  to
ensure that the Governor’s orders were carried
out fully.44
This  vertical  integration  of  the  Marcos
administration  of  the  relief  process  and
distribution of relief goods was built on politics
and dyadic ties, namely party loyalty and grass-
roots  communal  affiliation  and responsibility.
Such  personal  loyalties  in  the  context  of
disaster relief efforts were translated into the
political process in the Marcos years through
what  Carl  Lande  called  ‘vertical  chains  of
dyadic  patron-client  relationships,’  extending
from  the  provincial  elite  and  administrators
down  to  lesser  figures  in  the  towns  and
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barangays,  the  smallest  administrative  unit,
and  thence  to  the  citizens.45  It  was  this
indispensible  culturally  configured  informal
system  of  relationships  based  on  mutual-
assistance  and  responsibility  that  constituted
the real basis of political strength of the relief
work and partisan politics during the Marcos
years.46
However,  all  was  not  as  it  seemed  on  the
surface. Marcos stressed that Malacanang and
the Department of Social Services were taking
the lead role in the distribution of relief goods
until  conditions  returned  to  normal.  But
suspicions about political misuse of the disaster
aid  arose  over  reports  that  Australian  food
parcels had been relabelled as a ‘gift from the
President and First Lady,’ when handed out to
storm  and  volcano  victims.  The  Minister  of
Social  Services,  Sylvia  Montes,  quickly
countered the accusation stating that there had
been a misunderstanding because of the fact
that the Philippine government had been using
surplus Australian boxes to distribute its own
food in a separate project and had relabelled
them. The Minister of Social Services denied
any political  misappropriation of  the disaster
aid and said, ‘We can hold our heads high that
there is no pillage.’47 She also denied reports
that  starvation  was  spreading  among  the
victims  in  some  evacuation  camps.
When  their  ‘political  credit’  waned,  if  their
manipulation of relief funds failed to produce
the  desired  political  result,  Ferdinand  and
Imelda Marcos were apt to invoke the language
of miracles and the wrath of God, as a powerful
cultural-symbolic  idiom  for  the  retention  of
power and to excuse the state’s abrogation of
social responsibility. In this way, the President
and First Lady could shift the focus of attention
away from the charges of the political misuse of
relief  funds and the accusations of unbridled
development by calling upon the powerful idea
of  deus  maquina  (divine  intervention),  which
they  translated  into  a  culturally  familiar
religious message with a political twist. Instead
of implementing proper mitigation policies to
reduce the risk of typhoon and flood disasters,
Ferdinand  and  Imelda  Marcos  cunningly
focussed on nature itself,  in the guise of the
wrath of God. They took advantage of certain
religious beliefs about sin and punishment, and,
the godhead, and anthropomorphised nature’s
fury  in  terms  of  divine  intervention.  The
President  and  his  First  Lady  did  not  find  it
difficult or hypocritical to think and talk about
typhoon-  and  flood-related  mass  death  and
destruction in terms of the religious rhetoric of
divine  punishment  and  miracles  in  the
Philippine  context.  Indeed,  by  the  1980s,
newspaper findings suggest that Ferdinand and
Imelda Marcos attempted to impose the notion
of the wrath of God on storm-ravaged people
and flood victims in order to justify the failure
of  relief  efforts  and  circumvent  the  new
pressures put on their politically beleaguered
government by repeated typhoon strikes.
As  well  as  invoking  the  wrath  of  God,  Mrs
Marcos turned the oft-times perilous plight of
the squatters and esteros-dwellers to her own
political  advantage.  In  the  aftermath  of  the
disastrous  impact  of  Typhoon  Didang,  she
appeared on television and observed that the
squatters—human  and  industrial—on  the
esteros  were the primary cause of the floods
and  she  cal led  for  a  f irm  hand  by  the
government when dealing with them. ‘Illegally
built structures block the natural passage ways
of the rains to the Pasig River and Manila Bay,’
she said.48 She also stated that the ‘Government
must  learn  from  its  mistakes  and  short
sightedness in undertaking major construction
without  constant  regard  for  drainage
facilities.’49  But,  because  of  the  ongoing
environmental  destruction  based  on  building
office sky scrapers and opulent housing estates,
and  the  unrelenting  pace  of  rural-urban
migration, in reality the only way to make the
capital  flood-free  was  to  build  more  canals,
reservoirs and water catchment areas.
It is against this background of an emerging
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housing and environmental crisis and frequent
typhoon disasters that I now turn my attention
to Imelda Marcos’  grand vision,  to showcase
Manila to the world. The rise of commercial jet
travel and the rise of Imelda’s Manila in an age
of trans-national capital and investment went
hand-in-hand. The First Lady wanted to make
the capital  a  recognised destination for  both
the  jet-age  traveller  and  the  globe-trotting
business  executive.  She  understood  that
although the Philippines  appeared to  offer  a
large  and  growing  consumer  market  with  a
range  of  possibilities  for  international
development schemes, macro-investments and
global capital manoeuvring, its population was
not affluent, and much of it was still rural. In
late  1975,  the  First  Lady  was  declared
Governor of the new administration system of
Manila.50  The  stage-managed  development  of
Manila from this time onward presented Imelda
Marcos and her municipal administration with
a  unique  opportunity  to  construct  a  major
series  of  iconic  buildings  and  landscape
settings,  as  both an aesthetic  lure of  capital
and  market  networks  and  a  visible,  albeit
iconic,  sign  of  ‘progress’  under  new  society
rule,  signalling  a  city  moving  towards  the
future. But the First Lady’s aspirational vision
to make Metro Manila one of the great cities of
the world, in fact, gave birth to a programme of
urban renewal, whose fundamental social and
economic interests did not correspond with the
greater good.51
She considered, with the urban planners, that
the  top  priority  of  the  newly  established
Metropolitan  Manila  Commission  was  the
modernisation of Manila. This goal was to be
accomplished through the city’s  management
system  and  integrated  development
programmes.  Endorsed to head the city-wide
commission,  Imelda Marcos with her staff  of
planners  conceived  and  implemented  three
programmes ‘as a matter of survival,’ namely:
selective  flood  control  for  the  protection  of
parts  of  the  city  from the  ‘decay  of  death’;
public cleanliness and beautification. But there
was a flipside to the modern skyscrapers now
beginning to define the development of Manila
as  a  great  modern  urban  centre:  the  gritty
transport  system,  the  fetid  streets  and
laneways  of  the  down-  and-  out  districts,
teeming poverty,  and the ubiquitous  esteros.
And, Imelda Marcos’ team had no real answers
to  transform  the  impoverished  essence  of
Manila  that  now sat  alongside the emergent
Potemkin-like gloss and glamour of the city. In
the meantime, typhoons and floods continued
to  play  havoc  with  an  under-resourced
maintenance and flood-prevention program in
large  parts  of  the  diverse  and  multi-faceted
capital.
Conclusion
Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos did not only use
the productive character of ‘power’ to restrict
social  and  individual  possibilities.  They
produced  new  strategies  and  techniques  of
social control, through the development of their
vice-like  regulation  and  management  of
disaster relief and, correspondingly, new social
and  political  capacities  in  the  individuals
threatened  by  the  typhoons  and  floods.52
Kenneth Hewitt argues in interpreting the role
of hazards in third-world societies that if the
main purpose of government and scholars is to
bring aid to the needy after calamity has struck
then it  is  clear that these disaster-mitigation
responses were not working properly, and they
were making matters worse in the Philippines
of  the  1970s  and  mid-1980s.  These  failings
were  generated  by  preoccupations  of  the
Marcos  government  that  were  political-
economic,  agency  centred  and  selectively,
communal-centric.  There  was  no  need  to
question whether this was a deliberate moral or
technical  choice;  rather  it  was  a  simple  but
necessary side effect of partisan political and
institutional  arrangements.  It  is  the meaning
and implication of these arrangements as they
bear  upon  the  interpretation  of  risk  and
responsibility  for  damages  and  disaster
relief—but also, more importantly, in relation to
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‘who  eats  and  who  does  not’—with  which
Hewitt  is  concerned.53  Clearly,  the  Marcos
administration derived a dual benefit from the
destruction  and  deprivation  wrought  by  the
typhoons and floods: the value of the resources
they controlled became inflated in a political
and material sense, and they also controlled the
force necessary to either expand and protect,
or  deny,  the  support  of  redistributable
resources  and  aid.54
It is difficult to imagine what the Philippines
would  have  been  like  today  if  its  particular
post-1960s  environmental  history  under
Marcos had been different—one that had not
resulted in the creation of an asset stripped,
disaster-prone,  debris-strewn  landscape  in
many  parts  of  the  country.  Ferdinand  and
Imelda Marcos believed that creating a safer
environment in the face of typhoons and floods
was basically a political rather than an ethical
concern and one directed to those in power.
The deadly risks entailed in their self-seeking
model  of  disaster  relief  with  its  short-term
pragmatic political goals made explicitly clear
one  of  the  most  frightening  tradeoffs  in
Philippine history. Loyal local governments and
supporters would readily receive financial and
ma t e r i a l  s uppo r t  i n  o r de r  t o  s a ve
infrastructure, agricultural crops and as many
lives as possible, but individuals, communities
and areas opposed to the Marcos regime would
be sacrificed.
The  Marcos  regime  did  not  suffer  much
politically from the adverse effects of typhoons
and their  opposition did not  gain much.  The
government  had  political  ingenuity  and
substantial  resources  for  relief  and  rescue
operations at their disposal. Filipinos who were
positive about the Marcos government before
the  typhoons  of  the  early  1970s  remained
positive afterwards. Supporters and recipients
of relief aid had a consistently high opinion of
Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos. They would not
inflict  their  hostility  and  life-threatening
concerns  upon  the  couple  when  natural
disaster  struck.  But,  in  fact,  the  Marcos
regime’s  polit ical  culture,  which  was
increasingly  violent  and  moving  towards  yet
another  more-devastating  war  of  counter-
insurgency  on  the  flimsiest  of  cold-war
pretexts,  was  rapidly  destroying  the
environment  of  which  Filipinos  had  been
custodians for hundreds of years. The economic
and environmental politics of the government
reduced  increasing  numbers  of  people  to  a
state of impoverishment and chronic anxiety. At
the same time, a few politically well-connected
families  and  individuals  became  richer  and
richer. They and the government violated their
social  and  ethical  obligations  towards  the
victims of typhoons and floods and repeatedly
created  wealth  out  of  other  people’s
misfortune.
Hence,  at  the  height  of  the  political  ‘water
games’  damning  presidential  rhetoric  was
directed  at  the  anonymous  population  of
outcast  Manila—the  alleged  dangerous  slum-
dwelling rural migrants—who had swelled the
ranks of the city. As late as 1985, as floods and
heavy  storms  lashed  the  Philippines,  Marcos
would continue to blame the migrant poor for
the floods that tarnished Manila’s international
image, claiming Filipinos who clogged up the
canals  and  sewers  with  their  garbage  were
committing  an  ‘unpatriotic  and  selfish  act.’55
But, such floods and typhoon disasters had real
political utility and provided a silver lining for
the Marcos regime; one need only to look over
the  decade  spanning  the  mid-1970s  to
mid-1980s,  at  the  enormous  extent  of  direct
involvement of the First Lady in controlling the
regulation and distribution of relief aid in the
aftermath of the storms and floods, following
Typhoon Gloring. Indeed, huge sums of money
that had led to little or no success with respect
to effective flood control  had changed hands
without  direct  accountability  or  proper  risk
management measures in place.
Throughout  the  1970s  and  1980s,  these  so-
called  natural  disasters,  which  required
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mobilisation  of  nation-wide  relief  efforts,
emerged out of  a particular institutional  and
cultural  setting  in  the  Philippine  context.
Ferdinand  Marcos’  economic  reforms  had
brought  about  dramatic  socio-economic  and
ecological changes that increased the risks of
man-made rather  than natural  disasters.  But
the  President  and  First  Lady  steadfastly
refused to acknowledge the link between crony
capital ism,  unsustainable  economic
development  and  natural  disasters  in  an
increasingly  unstable  archipelago.  They
deliberately  remained  in  a  state  of  denial,
except  to  encourage  big  business,  overseas
governments  and  aid  agencies  to  provide
massive  injections  of  capital  and  material
support  for  relief  efforts,  rather  than
encouraging  them  to  support  appropriate
disaster-mitigation  strategies.
During the Marcos years in the 1970s and early
1980s, the loss of thousands of lives, as well as
the extensive damage caused by typhoons was
partially a consequence of settlement patterns
located  in  high-risk  areas;  namely,  the  sub-
standard  low-lying  locale  and  condition  of
settlement patterns in many of these areas; the
sub-standard  condition  of  many  homes  and
public buildings, and the poor design of roads,
bridges,  under-passes  and  drainage  canals.56
Hence,  the  storms  and  floods  affected  the
entire  urban community  in  Manila,  but  none
more  so  than  the  poor—in  particular,  the
squatters and shanty-town dwellers of Tondo.
Ironically, the growing number of urban poor in
Manila  was  largely  attributable  to  the
uncontrolled  sky’s-the-limit  policies  of  rapid
economic  growth  under  the  martial  law-lead
Marcos regime from the late 1960s to 1986.
Crony  Capitalism and  the  loss  of  livelihoods
and natural resources were the key causes for
understanding the basis of the increasing social
and environmental degradation in the city, not
the alleged dangerous lifestyle of the squatters
and  aspiring  migrants  from  the  provinces.
Imelda  Marcos  was  to  rapidly  instigate
sanitation  and  beautification  projects  with
considerable fanfare, but she certainly was not
prepared to condone the social tightening and
political reform and regulation of the market
economy, that was required to improve the lot
of Manila’s squatters and migrants living along
the esteros and in places like Tondo.
In  the  political  environment  of  the  Marcos
years, the government had sometimes blocked
aid for typhoon and flood victims. In the 1970s
and  early  1980s,  there  is  evidence  of  the
abrogation of international humanitarian relief
norms and international legal frameworks for
disaster relief under the Marcos regime in the
Philippines. During those years, wilful acts of
misappropriation and mismanagement of relief
funds, and theft and the improper sale of relief
supplies in the name of politics occurred on a
regular basis in the Philippines. Consequently,
adequate  food,  shelter  and  medical  care  for
thousands of people on the other side of the
political divide in the Marcos years, who were
adversely affected by typhoons and floods, was
never provided.
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